This is now, that was then
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you ain’t goin’ nowhere
Navy will decommission its entire fleet of Freedom-class combat warships
Four of the $3.2bn fleet set for scrap heap were commissioned in 2019 and 2020
Anti-submarine system 'did not work out technically', naval operations chief said
Ships 'incredibly expensive and [lack] the capabilities we expected': Rep. Smith
Added: 'They're not ready to do anything... When they are, they still break down'
USS St Louis, launched in August 2020, will serve just three years of 25-year life
Scrappings will save $391 million as US Navy plans new shipbuilding program
Crews at Naval Station Mayport, Florida will have to wait for new ships to arrive
Chinese Navy is set to count 460 warships by 2030, becoming world's largest
[Admiral Michael Gilday] told the House Armed Services Committee: 'I refuse to put an additional dollar against a system that would not be able to track a high-end submarine in today's environment.'
And Back Then:
2012: Navy dismisses criticism of littoral combat ships as outdated, inaccurate
Senior Navy officials have mounted a vigorous campaign to rebut recent criticism of the Littoral Combat Ship program. The program is funding parallel development of two classes of high-speed warships equipped with interchangeable mission packages for shallow-water missions such as minesweeping and antisubmarine warfare. Most of the attacks leveled by private think tanks and reporters have been aimed at Lockheed Martin’s lead ship, which was developed in record time and commissioned nearly two years ahead of the other version offered by Austal USA. Critics cite cracks, leaks and corrosion in Lockheed’s ship, and question whether the relatively low-cost vessels are sufficiently survivable for combat operations.
According to Navy officials, though, the criticism is about as shallow as the coastal waters in which the Littoral Combat Ship was conceived to operate. In a letter to Congressman Roscoe Bartlett on May 15, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Sean Stackley asserted that the kinds of problems seen on the Lockheed vessel are “not uncommon to first of class ships,” and stated that “the number of critical deficiencies was reduced near tenfold” in the second vessel of the same class — which has now completed three underway trials. Noting that problems on the lead ship had been studied and fixed, Stackley praised the features of both warship variants and argued that “they have appropriate levels of survivability for their intended operational environment.” The service plans extensive operational testing to verify survivability goals have been met.
A May 11 message sent to personnel of the Naval Sea Systems Command by Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy rejected recent criticism of the program, citing exacting design standards and successful underway trials. McCoy also reported progress on the modular warfighting packages that will enable the ships to perform a wide array of missions while costing much less than other surface combatants. InsideDefense.com reported on May 9 that the Navy is projecting the acquisition cost of each ship, not counting mission packages, will average $420 million over the next few years — 20 percent below congressional cost caps and less than half of what new destroyers cost. A key reason for developing the Littoral Combat Ship was to provide cheaper ways of dealing with low-intensity coastal threats such as pirates, diesel submarines, floating mines and terrorists in speedboats.
I especially like this editorial comment in the conclusion of the article:
It appears that critics have managed to mobilize the entire Navy in defense of the new warships. Although the Navy is sometimes described by outsiders as a fractious collection of competing communities, under Secretary Ray Mabus and deputy Robert Work, it has proven to be a remarkably unified and focused organization. If the other services were as effective at defending their programs, the joint force might be better prepared for the challenges of tomorrow.
But wait, there’s more! From the Navy’s internal report that the brass was responding to:
“This review highlights the gap between ship capabilities and the missions the Navy will need LCS to execute,” said the report prepared last year for the Navy by Rear Admiral Samuel Perez. “Failure to adequately address LCS requirements and capabilities will result in a large number of ships that are ill-suited to execute” regional commanders’ warfighting needs.
***
The Perez report also highlights the vessel’s limited combat capability. The Navy has acknowledged that the vessels are being built to the service’s lowest level of survivability, a Pentagon-approved decision that sought to balance cost and performance.
The ship “is not expected to be survivable in that it is not expected to maintain mission capability after taking a significant hit in a hostile combat environment,” Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester, said in a January report.
Even in its surface warfare role, when all armaments are working as intended, the vessel “is only capable of neutralizing” small, fast-attack boats and it “remains vulnerable to ships” with anti-ship cruise missiles that can travel more than five miles (8 kilometers), according to the Perez report. Iran has 67 such vessels, according to a chart in the report.
The Littoral Combat Ship is “ill-suited for combat operations against anything but” small, fast boats not armed with anti-ship missiles, the Perez report found.
I’ve been reading criticism of the littoral combat ship program for literally decades, and I’m just a layperson with no particular knowledge of naval matters, yet I could smell the stench of a protected boondoggle from 1,000 miles away (well, closer than that, actually, because some of the ships were being built, and failing, at Bath Ironworks). The Navy and its industrial and Congressional partners just kept on building and spending, because that’s what they do.
Well, at least Vladimir will feel better about his own country’s woeful defense programs.
(For real fun, look into the $25 billion Zumwalt Class destroyer program: 32 ships were planned, production stopped at 3, all of which lack a working weapons system. The Navy’s “looking into” a weapon that might work on the ships but in the meantime, they seem primarily to serve as fishing platforms for bored sailors.)
